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I. INTRODUCTION: THE EIGHTIES AND THE UNINSURED

Americans who lack private or public health insurance receive less
medical care than the insured. During the last decade, the ranks of the
uninsured swelled to over 30 million Americans,' with over twice that
number uninsured at some point during a three-year period, 2 fortunately
most for short-term periods. 3 There is some disagreement about the pre* Senior Research Associate, The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.; J.D.
1971, Harvard Law School; A.B. 1968, University of Chicago. Before coming to
the Institute, the author was an insurance regulator in Massachusetts. This
article draws upon work for the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's Health Program for the Uninsured and upon the author's address to the conference "Ohioans
Without Health Insurance: How Big a Problem? Are There Solutions?" on December 8, 1989, funded by The Law and Public Policy Program of the ClevelandMarshall College of Law. This support is gratefully acknowledged. The author
thanks Lawrence D. Brown, Richard E. Curtis, John Holahan, William G. Kopit,
Mark V. Pauly, Frank A. Sloan, and Katherine Swartz for their contributions to
his perspective. The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of the
author.
I The numbers of uninsured have repeatedly been documented, although different methods of estimation yield different estimates, as do different survey data
bases. Compare, e.g., K. SwARTz, THE MEDICALLY UNINSURED: SPECIAL Focus ON
WORKERS (1989) (The Urban Institute) (37 million non-elderly uninsured for all
or part of 1987) with Moyer, A Revised Look at the Number of UninsuredAmericans, 8 HEALTH AFFAIRS 102, no. 2 (Summer 1989) (31 million in 1987); see also,
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A PROFILE OF THE UNINSURED IN MICHIGAN

AND THE UNITED STATES (1990) (over 35 million in 1987, commenting on different

estimates).
2 Nelson & Short, Health InsuranceCoverage 1986-88, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES, Series P-70, No.

17 (March 1990) (63 million Americans lacking coverage for at least one month
during 1985-87).
a Swartz & McBride, Spells Without Health Insurance: Distributionsof Durations and Their Link to Point-in-Time Estimates of the Uninsured, 27 INQUIRY
281, no. 3 (Fall 1990) (half of all spells without insurance end within 4 months,
only 15% last over 24 months).
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cise extent of the uninsured, but there is general agreement about the
upward trend.4 Rises occurred at first during the recession of the early
1980s, then Medicaid cutbacks, and then, restructuring in labor and insurance markets reduced the extent of insurance coverage.
At the same time, the uninsureds' health care problems, difficulties in
obtaining access to medical services, and the fiscal problems of hospitals
that did serve them became ever more prominent. The dimensions of
these problems have been discussed in numerous scholarly publications,
such as medical journals, law reviews 7 and policy journals,8 as well as
in the popular press.9 Many approaches to solutions have been put forth.
Governments have also taken note. Legislative hearings and commissions' reports have commonly set out the extent of problems and possible
the state level, 1
solutions. 0 Most remedial legislation has occurred at
12
but there have been some federal initiatives as well.
4The exact composition of the uninsured is less well understood as are the
dynamics of the reasons that they lack coverage at the times they do. See generally
Swartz & McBride, supra note 3.
' On the average, the uninsured seems to get about one third as much hospital
care and see doctors about two thirds as often as the majority insured population.

See Long & Rodgers, Federal Options for Helping the Uninsured (unpublished

conference presentation A. Pub. Analysis and Mgmt., 1990). Given that most of
the uninsured are probably healthier than average, this "access gap" is probably
less significant when adjusted for health status or "need." Presumably in part
because of the gap, hospitals were the early 1980s vocal advocates for the uninsured. On the problems of hospital "uncompensated care," see generallyF. SLOAN,
J. BLUMSTEIN & J. PERRiN, eds., UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE (1986).
'E.g., Ginzberg, Health Care Reform - Why So Slow?, 322 N. ENGL. J. MED.
1464 (1990).

7E.g., Bovbjerg & Kopit, Coverageand Carefor the Indigent:Public andPrivate

Options, 19 IND. L. REv.857 (1986).
8E.g., Johnston & Reinhardt, Addressing the Health of a Nation: Two Views,
8 HEALTH AFF. 5, no. 2 (Summer 1989).
9E.g., When Illness Strikes and Health Insurance Won't Pay, Wash. Post/

Health, June 26, 1990, at 12, col. 1 [hereinafter Illness].
"0At the state level, see, e.g., GOvERNoR's COMMISSION ON OHIO HEALTH CARE
COSTS: FINAL REPORT (July 1984) (suggesting "care or share" program under which
licensed hospitals would have to provide 5% of the budget as charity care or
contribute the difference to a state fund that would subsidize other institutions

providing more than their share which was never enacted); J. LuaHns & R.
DESONIA, A REviEw OF STATE TASK FORCE AND SPECIAL STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS

37-8 (Nov. 1984) (Intergov'tal Health
Pol'y Project). At the federal level, the Pepper Commission has most recently
drawn attention to the uninsured. U.S. BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE A CALL FOR ACTION, (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter cited as PEPPER
To ADDRESS HEALTH CARE FOR THE INDIGENT

REPORT].
11 See, e.g., R. CURTIS & S. WHITE,eds., ACCESS To CARE FOR THE MEDICALLY
INDIGENT: A RESOURCE DOCUMENT FOR STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS (March 1985)

(Nat'l Governors Ass'n.).
12 Congress has addressed Medicaid coverage, the right of employees leaving
work to continue group health coverage, and the obligation of hospitals not to
"dump"patients seeking emergency services. See infra notes 33-36. Congress has
also generated information. E.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HEALTH
INSURANCE AND THE UNINSURED: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS, Committee
Print (1988). Many state and private analyses rely on government-supplied data
from national surveys.
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This article briefly discusses five salient issues for decision makers to
ponder, in Ohio and in the nation: (1) What, exactly, is the problem? (2)
What about National Health Insurance (NHI)? (3) What roles are likely
for national, state, and local governments? (4) How can one design solutions and evaluate the trade-offs they pose? (5) What are we willing to
pay? A major conclusion is that many ways exist to provide subsidized
coverage or other access to care. In other words, many possible solutions
exist. They have different emphases, different structural characteristics,
different benefits, and different price tags. What does not exist is consensus on the nature of the personal, business, and social obligations that
must underlie any possible solution. This lack makes the social-political
problems seem intractable, especially at the federal level. States will
probably continue to exercise leadership in this area. 3
H. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

In systems design, specificity is important. The first step in designing
a "solution," whether it is a state and local approach or a global system
run from Washington or Baltimore, is defining precisely what problem
one is addressing. This point seems straightforward, but is often ignored
by advocates.
The first question here is whether one sees a problem of hospital "uncompensated care,"'1 4 of people with health histories that make them "uninsurable,"'1 of workers who through no fault of their own have lost their

13 As will become clear, there is a case to be made for state leadership. See
infra Section V. There is considerable truth to the common, derogatory assertion
that Washingtonians can develop an "inside-the-Beltway" mentality. This mindset can obscure empathy for the state and local perspective. Moreover, markets
for health care and for health insurance are predominantly state and local, although payment decisions about Medicare, among other things, are made nationally and considerably affect local medical institutions. Most of what I have
learned about health care and especially about coping with the uninsured has
come by talking to people in the field, although sometimes the field is D.C.
" Clearly, burdens have grown for hospitals that treat uninsured patients (or,
by some definitions, also patients whose coverage pays less than the hospitals'
costs). E.g., CENTER FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS, GREATER CLEVELAND HOSPITAL A. THE

UNCOMPENSATED CARE CRISIS: 10 QUESTIONS FOR NORTHEAST OmoANs (1986).

Most observers count as "uncompensated" only hospital care knowingly given as
a matter of charity or, less willingly, after the fact, bills rendered that become a
bad debt - with the total being about two thirds charity, one third bad debt.
Other "below (average) cost" payments generally are not counted. These include
low payment levels from state Medicaid plans, "contractual allowances" given to
Blues Plans, and "discounts" given to Preferred Provider entities. It was hospitals
that first raised the issues at the state level, prompting a round of state study
commissions in the early 1980s.
11See, e.g., Bovbjerg & Keller, State Health Insurance Pools: CurrentPerformance, FutureProspects, 23 INQUIRY 111, 112 (Summer 1986).
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job-related coverage, 16 of welfare mothers who dare not give up Medicaid
even for a reasonably good job without health insurance, 7 of young people
in good health who do not buy coverage, or of uninsured people generally.
Most recently, and from this corner, more properly, attention has moved
to the general problems of all those who lack coverage, for whatever
reasons. These are all legitimate views of problems, but these different
perspectives
lead to quite different conclusions and policy recommenda8
tions.

Beyond differences in focus lie differences in philosophy, which often
vary by state or region, as already noted. There are four basic views of
health "rights" which are often invoked in policy discussions. 9 It might
be better to refer to fundamental fairness or equity rather than "rights,"
which connote a legally enforceable duty, but the terminology is well
established. Table 1 presents the philosophical spectrum.
Table 1: Competing Views of Rights in Health Care
Right to
health

Right to
health care

Right to equal floor
of medical access

Broadest
view of
all: equal
outcomes
for all,
large
public
role

Massachusetts
view: equal
access to
care for all,
including
very high-tech
care, publicly
guaranteed

President's Commission
view: public guarantees
adequate access of care
for all, subsidizing
needy as necessary

Right of equal
opportunity to
buy access
People "earn"
health coverage, like
other goods,
little public
role

Those deemed outside the workforce, the elderly of traditional retirement
age and the long-term disabled, get federal Medicare coverage. The deserving poor who cannot work (parents with dependent children, the aged,
blind, and disabled) also get public help, federal-state Medicaid. Everyone
else is on their own, possibly helped by public hospitals and an assortment
of public health programs.
In between, toward the left end, lies the old liberal vision of a "right
to health care." This is essentially a right to health care services, or
16 At the federal level, attention was early focused on the plight of workers
who lost health coverage when laid off in the recession, especially in the "smokestack" industries long accustomed to full coverage, in Ohio and elsewhere. E.g.,

Health Insurance For The Unemployed, HEARING BEFORE THE
HEALTH, COMM. ON FINANCE,

SUBCOMM.

ON

U.S. Sen., 98th Cong., 11th Sess., S. Hrg. 980187

(Apr. 21 & 27, 1983).
17See infra note 75.
"IOn policy choices, see infra Section V and accompanying notes 102 et. seq.

19This discussion is adapted from Bovbjerg, Human Organ Transplantation:
Societal, Medical-Legal, Regulatory, and Reimbursement Issues, 9 J. LEG. MED.
467-74 (1988).
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equality of access. Not necessarily a right to equal outcome, as at the far
left, but at least an equal chance to see doctors or enter a hospital. This
conception was at the center of most intellectual and policy discussions
in the 1970s and retains considerable force today. It is labelled the "Massachusetts" view because of that state's new approach to health coverage. 21 Allied with this view is often one that income or wealth is unfairly
distributed, 2and
redress should be a public function, certainly as it affects
2
health care.
The 1980s have moved the philosophical focus toward a right to an
equal floor of medical access. The idea of a decent minimum of health
care was popularized by a presidential commission, 2 and holds consid20Cf. CONSTITUTION OF THE WOiu HEALTH ORGANIZATION (defines expansive
view of health), as cited in Lave & Lave, Medical Care and Its Delivery: An
Economic Appraisal, 35 LAW & COMTEMP. PROB. 252, 254, n. 5 (1970).
21 Although not technically a mandate, the law is commonly described as such.
The state's employers (other than very small ones) are required to pay a payroll
tax unless they provide health care coverage. The state has also set up a "buyin" to Medicaid for the disabled and is arranging for pooled coverage for those
without workplace or public coverage. See, e.g., Massachusetts' Universal Access
Law, HEALTH CARE FOR THE UNINSURED PROGRAM UPDATE 3 (1988) (The Alpha
Center, May). Moreover, a well known Massachusetts Transplantation Task Force
successfully urged the state to apply the equal access principle even to hightechnology, expensive transplantation services. See, e.g., Annas, RegulatingHeart
and Liver Transplants in Massachusetts: An Overview of the Report of the Task
Force on Organ Transplantation,13 J. LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 4, no. 1 (Feb.
1985), discussed in Bovbjerg, supra note 19, at 472-78.
2 Such a definition of the problem really seeks income redistribution, from one
type of person to another and from one type of spending to another. It is common
for commentators to slide into such recommendations with little explanation. A
standard approach is to decry that "we" are spending X billion dollars on frivolous
fidgets (readers can name their own favorite low priority), whereas "we" should
be spending it on wonderful widgets (or their own favorite high priority). Properly
phrased, such debating points are hard to resist. The conceptual problem is that
different "we's" allocate the different dollars, and the allocations have not been
made a matter of explicit social choice (not yet, at least). In any case, if one favors
a great deal of such redistribution, the ultimate redistributive pot that we have
is the federal tax system; there are distinct limits to private cross-subsidies and
even to state mandates and funding. Privately, insurance rates and hospital
charges effect some cross-subsidies. So do state systems of taxation and benefits.
However, competition limits the ability of any non-universal system to crosssubsidize without the consent of the payer. Hospitals and insurers can lose business, and states can lose businesses and population. Federal policy is already
redistributive, without explicit acknowledgement, and in the "wrong" direction
from the above perspective; the open-ended tax subsidy gives no benefit to the
uninsured, poorer population, and higher benefits to higher-income people. One
might say that the (largely uninsured) farm workers pay higher taxes so that
the (heavily insured) auto workers can pay less. For an argument that a tax credit
to all should replace this regressive tax subsidy, see Enthoven, A New Proposal
to Reform the Tax Treatment of Health Insurance, 3 HEALTH AFFAIRS 21, no. 1,
(Spring 1984); Enthoven, Health Tax Policy Mismatch, 4 HEALTH AFFAIRS 5, no.
4, (Winter 1985).
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS

IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SUMMING UP, vol. 1

(March 1983).
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erable middle-of-the-road appeal to socially responsible conservatives 24
and practical liberals. 25 It emphasizes an achievable sort of equality of
access to basic services, not perfect access to everything the medical system can deliver, or learn to deliver. As just noted, standard American
practice, as opposed to philosophizing, lies well to the right of even the
equal-floor philosophy of fairness.
How one views the dictates of fairness in health care has much to do
with one's attitude toward mandating or funding additional insurance.
These same views also color how one approaches who should be covered
and the content of any additional coverage. Actual implementation of
any additional state or federal commitment calls for considerable effort
at defining such content. Oregon has sought to spell out what decency
requires in its Medicaid program and has been castigated for "rationing. '26
Yet, implementing any of the achievable visions of health care rights
calls for innumerable decisions about what is or is not covered.
Fertility services were mentioned at the conference. Are these important enough to cover? This might seem a matter for a case-by-case decision
by separate plans because values differ as do resources. Indeed, such
choices were traditionally left to doctors and their patients, as private
and public plans paid indiscriminately for all "medically necessary" care,
with a few exclusions like cosmetic surgery or non-reconstructive dentistry. The scope for explicit exclusions has been narrowed considerably
by states' "mandated benefits" legislation applicable to privately insured
care. 27 Broader coverage means more expense. Mandates raise the cost
of insurance benefits and appear to reduce the extent of voluntary pur0 8
chase.
An open issue is the extent to which any further expansion of health
coverage to the uninsured will be allowed to offer less than the full panoply of benefits available from modern medicine. Presently, some states
29
allow coverage for newly insured people to waive mandated benefits.
24 Blumstein, Financing Uncompensated Care: An Approach to the Issues, 38
J. LEG. EDUC.51.1 (1988).
Some, however, continue to dismiss such approaches as "two-tier medicine,"
holding that programs for poor people are poor programs, an aphorism that is
virtually an article of faith among liberal social insurance congnicenti. Cf. K.
ERDMAN & S. WOLFE, POOR HEALTH CARE FOR POOR AMERIcANs: A RANKING OF
STATE MEDicArD PROGRAMS (1987) (Pub. Cit. Hlth Rsch Grp.).
26 On the misuse of this inflammatory word, see, e.g., Bovbjerg & Held, Ethics
and Money: The Case of Kidney Dialysis and Transplantation,1 Topics IN Hosp.
L. 55 (Sept. 1986).
27 Such mandates generally call for insurance policies to cover services from
particular sorts of providers-psychologists and chiropractors are classic examples-or particular services, such as fertility treatment. Because of federal ERISA
pre-emption, they do not apply to self-insured plans, see Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra

note 7, at 906-08. Such uncovered plans now account for the majority of large
groups' plans. The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, which tracks this
matter, counts over 800 mandates as of summer 1990. Personal communication
from G. Scandlen, Director of State Studies, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Assoc.,
Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Scandlen].
Gabel & Jensen, The Price of State Mandated Benefits, 26 INQUIRY 419 (1990).
2 See Scandlen, supra note 27.
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Just as "necessity" or "right" to services can be considered service by
service, it can also be judged for each service rendered to an individual
patient. Here, consensus is emerging that "managed care," through utilization review and other means, is acceptable. Many different approaches
are being tried. How much society can or should want to standardize such
choices in any expansion of coverage also remains an open question.
III. "NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE": WHAT IS IT? WHEN IS IT?

A. What Is National Health Insurance?
The next topic is National Health Insurance (NHI), which in discussions
ofpaying for medical services always seems on the horizon. What is NHI,
anyway? The term means radically different things to different people.
The ultimate issue is access to medical services when in need. Many
people feel this is a basic human right, 30 although our legal and political
systems have never taken this view.31
In considering NHI, it is instructive to remember that we actually have
a kind of national health insurance now, although this is not generally
appreciated. 32 Congress has enacted national access to hospital care; not
by providing payment, not for all patients and not by creating a positive
mandate for providers to reach out to patients. Rather, 1985 budget
legislation created penalties against hospitals that turn away patients
needing emergency care.3 3 This "COBRA" legislation exemplifies the classic American "safety net" approach to social issues like national health

insurance; the public sector assumes only marginal, not fundamental
responsibility. It also represents vintage 1980s public-sector thinking:
promise them anything, but keep spending "off budget," and try mightily
not to raise taxes. COBRA is not without meaning. It helps secure a
limited right of access to the most crucial form of care, anywhere in this
country. Nonetheless, people can be forgiven for believing that carrying
evidence of good insurance coverage will be more beneficial, even in an
emergency.
30 Both opinion polls and scholarly writing support this statement. See, e.g.,
Gabel, Cohen & Fink, Americans' Views of Health Care: Foolish Inconsistencies,

8 HEALTH AFFAIRS 103, 111, no. 1 (Spring 1989) (42% of Americans surveyed think
right to health care is in constitution); PRESIDENTS COMMISSION FOR THE DiscusSION OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING AcCEss To HEALTH CARE, vols 1-3 (March

1983).
"1There is no fundamental, constitutional right to health care. There is not
even a general statutory right, with specific exceptions like emergency care. See
generally Bovbjerg & Kopit, supranote 7, at 871-91 (1986); Blumstein, supra note
24, at 514-17 (1988).
12 1 owe this insight-which seems obvious only in hindsight-to my colleague,
Mark V. Pauly, of the University of Pennsylvania.
33 CONSOLIDATED OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-272, §9121, 100 Stat. 82,164 et seq. (approved Apr. 7,1986). Inside the Beltway,
the Act is known as "COBRA," in the tradition of its predecessors OBRA and
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Beyond emergency care, Congress in recent years also encouraged or
required states to expand Medicaid coverage for children. This is the first
time Congress went beyond the traditional definition of income eligibility.34 Even after some limited recent expansions, however, Medicaid still
covers less than half of people below the poverty line. COBRA also expanded large employers' obligations to allow laid-off employees to con35
tinue to participate in group health insurance.
Such incremental federal efforts as COBRA and targeted Medicaid
expansions are certainly not what people have considered to be NHI since
the early 1930s when NHI first appeared on the national agenda.36 Although NHI means different things to different people, at a minimum it
means mandatory, universal, prepaid coverage of some sort, probably also
with similar if not identical benefits for all. The raison d'etre of NHI has
always been expanded access to coverage and care. Most recently, the
potential for cost containment has also proved an attraction.
There are many possible models for a national system. Perhaps the
largest change would be to move to a national health service (NHS). A
NHS would mean public ownership of medical facilities or employment
of medical personnel on the British or, perhaps, on a Scandinavian
model.3 7 An NHS is the most interventionist approach and may indeed
seem foreign; but smaller-scale U.S. models already exist for direct public

TEFRA, and its successors like SOBRA. For a discussion of COBRA provisions,
see Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 7, at 878-79: Any hospital that participates in
Medicare or Medicaid, which includes almost all of the community hospitals in
the country, and that has an emergency room, as most do, must treat someone
who is an emergency patient or in active labor, or at least stabilize them before
referring them to somewhere else that agrees to treat them. Enforcement relies
on fines, with an ultimate sanction of expulsion from Medicare-Medicaid participation. Through 1989, only one physician had been cited for dumping. See
Schutte, Did this Doctor Dump his Patient or Exercise Prudent Care?, MEDICAL
ECONOMICS 66 (Nov. 1989); see also Bankhead, MD Loses Patient Dumping Case,
Medical World News, Aug. 28, 1989.
I. HILL, BROADENING MEDICAID COVERAGE OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND CHILDREN: STATE POLICY RESPONSES (1987) (Nat'l Governors Ass'n). The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (SOBRA) allowed states to cover poor pregnant
women and their infants who are above current income eligibility limits. 1990
amendments required states to cover all poor children through the age of 19,
phasing the requirement in to continue coverage as the existing cohort of covered
children ages, one year at a time. See, e.g., Pear, Deficit or No Deficit, Unlikely
Allies Bring About Expansion in Medicaid, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1990, at 1.
Another provision of COBRA allows those terminated from employment (and
divorced or widowed spouses) to continue coverage at their own expense, paying
the average group rate for up to 18 months. See Abramowitz, U.S. Begins Mandating Health Care, Washington Post, Aug. 12, 1986, at D.1.
For a good history of efforts to promote more universal health coverage, see
P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 235-89 (1982);

see also Levey & Hill, NationalHealthInsurance - The Triumph of Equivocation,
321 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1750 (1989) (adds recent history).
7 For a brief description of Britain, see H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL
PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE 14-25 (1984).
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provision of medical services.38 However, most Americans think of national health insurance. Just what kind of coverage NHI would provide,
how much it would vary according to individual or social preferences, and
who should pay for it are major variables. So is the extent to which NHI
plans would restructure the provision of care and the bearing of insurance
risk, as well as the approach taken for regulatory or competitive cost
controls.
The diversity of possibilities is enormous.3 9 Proponents often look to
other countries' NHI plans for inspiration, especially Canada 40 and the
Federal Republic of Germany.41 Canada and Germany are of course much
more like the United States than is Great Britain, not only socially and
in economic development, but also in having federal systems. 42 It is not
necessary to look overseas to find models for NHI, however, as there are
numerous home-grown approaches that could be adapted. One existing
national insurance model is Medicare. Medicare puts all the (social security covered) aged under one uniform national plan, federally defined
and funded, with regulatory authority, but with contracted-for private
administration of provider payments.4 3 Medicare could be expanded to
At the federal level, there is the nationally funded and operated veterans
hospital system. See, e.g., F. WILSON & D. NEUHAUSER, HEALTH SERVICES IN THE
UNITED STATES 100, (2d ed. 1982). At the state and local level, public health is a
long-standing governmental function, and many medical services are provided
by public institutions and personnel. See, e.g., Jain, Role of State and Local Gov'ts
in Relation to Personal Health Services, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (supplemental
issue 1981).

39It is impossible to summarize all the many variants of NHI that have been
proposed. For a selection of recent proposals, see S. BUTLER & E. HAISLMAIER, A
NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA (1989) (mandatory individually purchased coverage of major risks; tax benefits changed to encourage economizing);
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMISSION ON HEALTH CARE, FOR THE HEALTH OF A NATION: A SHARED RESPONSmUY (1989) (mixed public-private-employer system of
universal coverage); Himmelstein, Woolhandler, Writing Committee of the Working Group on Program Design, A NationalHealth Programfor the United States:
N. ENGL. J. MED. 102 (1989) (universal coverage; hospitals
A Physicians'Proposal,
on budgets, other services paid from single payer, federal funding through income
tax); A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING
COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980); Enthoven & Kronick, A Consumer-ChoiceHealth
Plan for the 1990s: UniversalHealth Insurance in a System Designed to Promote
Quality and Economy, 320 N. ENGL. J. MED. 29, 94 (parts 1 & 2, 1989) (very
thorough restructuring of coverage into competing HMOs or HMO-like entities,
with federal tax credits for all citizens).
See, e.g., Iglehart, Canada'sHealth Care System, 315 N. ENGL. J. MED 202,
778, 1623 (1986); Linton, The CanadianHealth Care System: A CanadianPhysician's Perspective, 322 N. ENGL. J. MED. 197 (1990).
"1See, e.g., Reinhardt, West Germany'sHealth-Careand Health-InsuranceSystem: Combining Universal Access with Cost Control (Report for U.S. Bipartisan
Comm. on Comprehensive Health Care) (June 25, 1990). For an older but useful
description of eight countries' plans, see NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESOURCE
BOOK, 275-428 (1974) (Prepared by the Staff of the Committee on Ways and
Means).
421 owe this insight to my colleague, Lawrence D. Brown of Columbia University.
3
4 On the current state of Medicare, see, e.g., M. PAULY & W. KISSICK, eds.
LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TwENTY YEARS OF MEDICARE (1988).
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the entire population. A "national" but joint federal-state insurance approach is Medicaid, with minimum standards set federally, with slidingscale federal subsidy, and with major options open to state determination
and with state administration. 44 Essentially on this model, it has been
proposed that minimum national standards be set for state-by-state determination of the insurance mandates to be imposed. 45 A national but
privately operated system is the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan,
under which the employer sets basic rules and levels of contributions,
but employees and private insurers (including HMOs) determine the exact contours of coverage. 46 Other possibilities include a national version
of compulsory employer provisions of health insurance. This could mean
the Hawaii or Massachusetts plans writ large. 47 This approach is essentially that suggested by the4 Kennedy-Waxman proposals and the recent
Pepper Commission report. 1
B. The Shifting Prospects for National Health Insurance
Will Americans move to a more global system? In the long run, the
answer has always seemed likely to be yes. Why? In large part, because
every other advanced nation has done so. So it seems very probable that
eventually we will opt for some variant of NHI. 49 National health insurance has been on the American national agenda at least since the 1930s,
before there was even significant private health insurance. 50 NHI probably came closest to fruition in the early 1970s. Many powerful politicians
and interests were lined up in favor; what they were against was mainly
organized medicine. Agreement seemed near as President Richard Nixon,
his HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson, Senator Edward Kennedy, and
Congressmen Wilbur Mills, among others, all made different but seemingly reconcilable proposals.
One way to recall how the prospects for NHI seeped away is to note
the curiously hydraulic fashion in which its principals melted away. President Nixon fell victim to Watergate. Congressman Mills was washed up
after his Tidal Basin escapades. Senator Kennedy's fortunes took a dip
See generally R.A. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE [N AMERICA:
A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID (1974); R. BOVBJERG AND J. HOLAHAN, MEDICAID IN
THE REAGAN ERA: FEDERAL POLICY AND STATE CHOICES

(1982).

Cohodes, There May Be More Than One Pathto Nirvana,27 INQUIRY 5 (Spring
1990).
"The FEHBP indeed inspired Alain Enthoven's NHI Plans, see supra note 22.
47 See e.g., The Hawaii PrepaidHealth Care Act of 1974, codified, HAw. REV.
STAT.393-1-393-51.

- See Basic Health Benefits for ALI Americans Act of 1989 (Senate Bill of Sen.
Kennedy); McIlrath, PepperCommision Ensures Insurance,Long Term Care,Am.
Med. News, March 16, 1990, at 1, col. 2; see also supra notes 10 and infra notes

117 and 118.
49NHI seems virtually unique; although other social welfare programs, like
child allowances, are also common outside the United States, unlike NHI they
are not well weigh universal.
See generally P. STARR, supra note 36.
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at Chappaquiddick. Watergate also beached ex-HEW Secretary Elliot
Richardson, who ironically ended the decade as Ambassador to the conference on the law of the sea. These metaphors may be all wet; but in
any event, President Jimmy Carter's subsequent NHI campaign promises
sank without a trace. In the latter 1970s, the ill-fated hospital cost-control
bill that he considered an essential precursor to NHI was twice soundly
defeated by Congress. In the conservative tide of the 1980s, no serious
federal legislative effort ever surfaced. 5'
The short-run view of NHI's prospects has always seemed less favorable
to enactment than the long run. A few years ago, the near-term answer
about NHI was a clear, "absolutely no way," certainly not, by the end of
the century. "Pro-competitive," privately oriented approaches were in
52
vogue, both to contain health spending and to promote health coverage.
Additional public spending on new programs was taboo, especially at the
federal level, and even "off-budget" mandates were out of favor. At the
dawn of the 1990s, it seems more of a 50/50 proposition that we might
enact some kind of mandate nationally. There might even be some federal
funding or tax incentives. It is really quite surprising that the outlook
should have changed so much.
What has changed the short-run outlook? The political climate is notoriously hard to predict even as far as the next election, but the current
White House no longer claims that "government is the problem, not the
solution," to all new initiatives. Further, the federal government expanded Medicaid for children during the autumn 1990 budget debacle,
even while facing a restive electorate, uncertain economic forecasts, and
new obligations of growing magnitude for the savings and loan bailout
and military operations in the Middle East.5 3 The policy backdrop also
seems to be shifting. Perhaps, most importantly, the sheer bulk of the
uninsured claims more attention. Fully one-sixth of the non-elderly population lacks coverage when surveyed at a single point in time, and
considerably more lack coverage at some time during one year.6 A contributing factor is the trend in this statistic. The 1980s witnessed a continuing decline in coverage, reversing our accustomed historical pattern
of steady growth. Sixteen percent of the population without coverage
seems like a bigger number when it is growing than when it promises to
decline with no particular public effort. It appears that our reliance on
private insurance with public tax subsidy, which has served so well for
so long, may be reaching its natural limit. 55
51For a good, readable overview of the ebb and flow of federal health policy
over the last generation, see L. BROWN, HEALTH PoLicY IN THE UNITED STATES:
ISSUES
AND OPTIONS, FORD FOUNDATION, OCCASIONAL PAPER, No. 4 (Sept. 1981).
52
See, e.g., C. HAviGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY (1982);
Bovbjerg, Competition versus Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 965 (1981). Even President Carter's former pro-regulatory Secretary of HEW joined the bandwagon for private action, J. CALIFANo,
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION (1986).
See supra notes 34 and infra note 91.
"See supra notes 1 & 2.
See Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 7, at 892.
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All over the country, the public's appreciation of the magnitude of
uninsurance woes has increased. The impact of these statistics has been
intensified by heartrending stories about the agonies of people who have
lost or exhausted their health coverage. 56 Such developments prompt calls
for action at both state and federal levels,57 although willingness to pay
for major new initiatives remain suspect. 58 In Cleveland and in Ohio, for
example, the rise in the uninsured has drawn considerable attention,5 9
even though the area is better off than comparable areas,60 apparently
for a variety of reasons.
A second reason for renewed interest in a comprehensive, national plan
is the continuing rapid growth in the price of private coverage. Early
business optimism that better management and competitive initiatives
could control health care spending8 l has faded. There is a growing sense
among many opinion leaders that no one payor alone can "fix" cost-containment problems. Private and public commentators alike harp on the
continuing growth of health spending, especially in comparison to other
countries.6 The U.S. ranks far ahead of any national system in spending
as a share of GNP,6 yet is readily castigated for its relatively poor showing
on such measures of health as infant mortality and life expectancy." Some
private companies that once found national mandates or controls anathema to the free enterprise system have begun to support some form of
centralized intervention.6 Similarly, physicians and hospital interests

See Illness, supranote 9, at 12. Recipients of public assistance, like Medicaid,
are better off than those with no Medicaid coverage. But for many reasons, including low allowable fees, even Medicaid recipients may have trouble seeing

doctors. See, e.g., Hill, Medical CareIs Running out for Poor Women, Washington

Post, Aug. 9, 1990, at C1, col. 2.
61E.g., Pollner, Access to Care: Odds of NationalPlan Grow with Grass-Roots
Discontent, MEDICAL WORLD NEws 53 (Nov. 27, 1989).

See infra Section VI and accompanying notes 112-126.
See Austrian & Cleeton, The Medically Uninsured:A Focus on the Cleveland
MetropolitanArea, REI REVIEW 21 (Spring 1989).
Id.
I"
61
E.g., J. CAuFANO, supra note 52.
E.g., Stevens, Why Business is Rushing to Support NHI, MEDICAL ECONOMICS
132 (Aug. 21, 1989). Wagner, Business Agitates for Health System Revamp, MODERN HEALTHCARE 16 (Nov. 24, 1989).
6 Schiever & Pouiller, InternationalHealth CareExpenditure Trends: 1987, 8
HEALTH AFFARmS 169 no.3, (Fall 1989).
See generally Wegman, Annual Summary of Vital Statistics-1985, 78 PEDIATRICS 983 (1986) (U.S. infant mortality of 10.6 per 1000 births, versus 8.4 in
Canada, 6.7 in Sweden). Of course, health care does far more than save lives,
with great expenditures going to making patients better functioning and more
comfortable, not to mention making health care more convenient and more pleasant.
E.g., Winslow, National Health Plan Wins Unlikely Backer: Business, Wall
St. J., April 5, 1989 at B1, col. 3; Bacon, Business and Labor Reach a Consensus
on Need to Overhaul Health-Care System, Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 1989, at A16;
Swoboda, Major Firms, Unions Join in National Health Insurance Bid, Washington Post, March 14, 1990, at F1, col. 2.
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are speaking up in favor of NHI rather than opposing it as a means of
governmental control of their professions. 6 Even organized medicine has
moved from stand-fast opposition to promotion of its own plan. The American Medical Association favors mandatory workplace coverage and state
Medicaid for everyone below the poverty line. 67 To be sure, most opponents

are not convinced, and there is no consensus on what form centralized
efforts should take. Yet, the signs of change in the once uniformly hostile
climate of opinion are striking.
Finally, some current portents favor more action on coverage. The new
disease, AIDS, has shown how suddenly major new medical spending can
become needed and how impossible insurance can be to get." In addition
to this, the publicity about continuing scientific breakthroughs in genetic
and other screening raises the possibility that many more people will
soon be finding that insurers (and employers) are excluding them from
70
coverage (or jobs), 69 despite laws meant to prevent such discrimination.
Such discrimination is an extreme form of the continuing risk segmentation of health insurance markets. Risk selection is a key component of
the insurance business, and insurers have become ever more accomplished underwriting risks and using experience rating. Increased competition and increased pressure from insureds to economize on spending
seems to have exacerbated these tendencies in recent years.7 1 This makes
coverage less expensive for those with good (expected) experience, but far
more expensive for others. There is some fear that continuing risk selection will make the entire system unravel, particularly in the market for
small-business coverage.

E.g., Relman, UniversalHealth Insurance: Its Time Has Come, 320 N. ENGL.
J. MED.
117 (1989).
67
E.g., Perrone, AMA's Health Access America Would Cut Costs, Cover All,

Am. Med. News, March 16, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
See Francis & Chin, The Preventionof Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
in the United States, 257 J.A.M.A. 1357 (1987); J. EDEN, L. MOUNT, & L. MniE,
AIDS AND HEALTH INSURANCE: AN OTA SURvEY (1988) (U.S. Congress Office of

Technology Assessment, Staff Paper).
D. NELSON AND L. TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS (1989); Bovbjerg &
Curtis, States Are ConfrontingAdverse Side Effects of Health Competition, 4 Bus.
& HEALTH 49 (1987).

10 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has promulgated model rules against use of medical testing for antibodies to the AIDS HIV
virus. Most states have not adopted such rules; see, e.g., Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1782 (1987)

(calling for stronger provisions to assure cross-subsidy for AIDS coverage); Clifford
& Iuculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1806 (1987) (explaining traditional view of insurers as spreading
risk among like insureds, rejecting cross-subsidy); J. EDEN, L. MOUNT, & L. MnKE,
supra note 68 (efforts to weed out HIV infected people are common in the markets

for individual and small group insurance).

11See Bovbjerg and Curtis, supra note 69.
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C. Liberals, Conservatives, and Consensus
Intellectually, the traditional arguments for national health insurance
are liberal ones:72 life chances should be equalized, risk of poor health
should be spread or socialized, and all of society should help because all
benefit from having the whole population be healthy. Therefore, needy
people should get health benefits through a redistribution of (in-kind)
income. Moreover, people with means should paternalistically be required
to cover themselves and their families, just as we require all car owners
to buy insurance. 73 Conservatives have traditionally opposed an enlarged
public role in health insurance as in other areas, emphasizing
the im74
portance of economic freedom and individual choice.
There are also good, if underappreciated, conservative arguments for
broader coverage. The most important is that society should encourage
people to work. A good way to make work more attractive is to ensure
that some basic level of health benefits is uniformly attached to a job.
We certainly do not want work to be less attractive than welfare, with
its Medicaid benefits. 75 Another notable conservative rationale for a public role is that mandates of certain coverage are warranted as a way of
preventing people from "free riding" on the social safety net by failing
to insure themselves. This rationale applies with much force to "catastrophic" expenditures for which public assistance is most likely through
76
public hospitals, private hospitals' COBRA obligations, or otherwise.
Moreover, business people have come to appreciate that their hospital
bills are somewhat higher because hospitals have to make up for bills
unpaid by the uninsured.7 7 Pragmatic conservatives also note that no
private health plan gets a better price for hospital or physician services
78
than Medicare or Medicaid.
72

See, e.g., E. KENNEDY, IN CRITICAL CONDITION: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S
CARE (1972).
73A large share of the uninsured are not impoverished. Three quarters work
or are dependents of workers. And three million or so children are uninsured in
families where a parent is insured. M. SULVETTA & K. SwARTZ, THE UNINSURED
AND UNCOMPENSATED CARE: A CHARTBOOK (1986) This finding strongly suggests
that families give insurance lower priority for personal spending than do many
advocates of NHI.
74Auto insurance can be distinguished because traditional mandates required
liability coverage, not first-party insurance for one's self and family. No-fault
coverage, however, has also been made mandatory.
76
Glazer, Reform Work, Not Welfare, 40 THE PuBLIc INTERET 3, 7-8 (1975). In
recent years, states have been allowed to continue Medicaid coverage for up to
six months for recipients losing eligibility for cash assistance because of taking
a job.
76 See Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, Strategiesin Underwritingthe Costs
of CatastrophicDisease, 40 LAw & CoNTrEMP. PRO. 122 (1976).
"Note, however, that the uninsured use considerably less care than the insured, see supra note 5, so that it is not true that supplying coverage would
typically be cheaper than subsidizing care (less) after the fact.
78 Arguments continue, however, about the relative utilization and quality of
the services received.
HEALTH
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Finally, consider two less familiar arguments that should appeal to
conservatives and liberals alike. First, the insurance market now organized around work place groups simply does not offer conventional coverage with a promise of renewability to retirement age. There is no private
safety net for sale. Second, entrepreneurship is inhibited by the difficulty
and high cost of finding individual or small-group insurance. Someone
leaving IBM to start the next Apple Computers often cannot afford to
take his IBM health care coverage with him, even if his health is
exemplary. 79 Small firms have a disproportionately hard time affording
coverage, 80 yet many believe that they contribute disproportionately to
the development of new jobs and the country's ability to compete glob8
ally. '
Thus, there are a lot more voices being heard lately on this topic-and
different ones than the liberals who were heard in the 1970s. Supporters
are not just big labor and public health officials any more. Still, all these
voices are as yet still something of a babble. The multitude of advocates
have not agreed on a single course of action; everyone continues to favor
their own perspective.8 2 There are also considerable differences in possible
approaches by levels of government, to which this article turns next.
IV. FEDERALISM: WHY STATES AND LOCALITIES MATTER

Differences of opinion make horse races. They also underlie our federal
system. Federalism allows quite different approaches to social policy to
coexist, and incidentally allows social experimentation on a scale unknown elsewhere in the world. This section considers the respective roles
of different levels of government, whether under NHI or not. This is not
to slight the role of the private sector, which insures most non-elderly

7'The 1989 Budget Act extended COBRA continuation protection even to those
leaving voluntarily and to those whose new job's coverage is not as good as the
old. Sloan, But What about Your Insurance? N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1990, at 32, col.
1. But most do not take such coverage. Of course the founder's COBRA continuation cannot help prospective employees of the fledgling firm.

See Health Insurance:Availability and Adequacy for Small BusinessesBefore
the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, House Comm. on Energy and

Commerce, Oct. 16, 1989 (statement of M. Nadel for the U.S. General Accounting

Office); see also Bovbjerg, Insuring the Uninsured through Private Action: Ideas
and Initiatives, 23 INQUIRY 403 (1986) (discusses inherent advantages of larger

groups for insurance purposes).

81 See Did America's Small FirmsEver

Get off the Launching Pad?,ECONOMST

61 (June 30, 1990) (casts doubt on 1980s conventional wisdom that as many as
eight of ten new jobs are created in small firms, noting inter alia that small firms
lack health insurance and have trouble competing for employees).
For example, one may note that the United States' auto companies, facing
competitors with much lower health costs, especially for retirees, are among the
most vocal in changing position. Further, physicians are very concerned that the
"wrong" type of NHI should not be enacted - from their perspective.
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Americans.n Achieving major changes in insurance is going to take some
combination of new mandates and new money-public functions in addition to some restructuring and some education.8
What level of government, however, is expected to take action? Historically, the reason for state and local involvement is that our major
social safety net is maintained at the state and local level.8 5 The federal
government has come late to health care. 86 Even then, it has accepted
only specified responsibilities to certain defined populations, not a general
duty to everyone or the responsibility ofprovider of last resort. In contrast,
we have a history of local general public hospitals and of charity care. 7
This "system" is not systematic. Provision of health services is generally
not a formal legal obligation," but it is the major practical safety net,
and it is state and local.
Today's situation is very different from the early 1970s. Then, when
people talked about NHI or any other expansion of the public role in
health care, they clearly envisioned a centralized, "top-down" model. A
lot of things in those days were top-down models.8 9 Today is different for
many reasons. For the moment, we are looking to the states in part by
default. As of the early 1990s, federal initiative has been immobilized by
budgetary paralysis and political reluctance to chop existing obligations

- It bears re-emphasizing that the private sector is the reason that the "glass"
of health care coverage is 5/6 full rather than mostly empty, as it was in the early
1950s. Private employers and private insurers (of course encouraged by tax incentives) cover by far the majority of the population. See generally HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA

(1989). The respective strengths and weakness of public and private action are a
complex matter worthy of more extended discussion elsewhere. It suffices here to
note that the public sector must do more in order to reach many or most of the
17% of the non-elderly now without health coverage. Further private action can
improve access to coverage, but there are limits to what wholly private action
can achieve. See Bovbjerg, supra note 80.
84 It should not be surprising that bringing coverage to the currently uninsured
should take mandates and money. After all, that is how most of us get our coverage
now. Employers and unions paternalistically give us a very constrained choice
- take wholly or heavily subsidized coverage as a tax-free fringe benefit or get
no benefit at all. Individuals and workers in less paternalistic (usually, smaller)
firms do not face this type of private, subsidized "mandate." Bovbjerg, Health
Insurance for the Working Uninsured:A Framework for Policy Development, in
FACILITATING HEALTH CARE COVERAGE FOR THE WORKING UNINSURED: ALTER-

NATIVE STATE STRATEGIES (National

Governors' Ass'n. ed. 1987).

See e.g., S. JAIN, supra note 38.
Exceptions to this generalization concern early federal hospitals and the
Public Health Service for merchant mariners, as well as coverage for federal
employees, military and civilian, where the government acts more in the capacity
of an employer than a government. See generally F. WILSON & D. NEUHAUSER,
supra note 38, passim.
87H. DOWLING, CITY HOSPITALS: THE UNDERCARE OF THE UNDERPRIVILEGED
(1982).
a' See supra note 7; see also supra note 24.
E.g., Blumstein, Effective HealthPlanningin a Competitive Environment, in
COST, QUALITY ACCESS IN HEALTH CARE, 21 28-37 (F. Sloan, J. Blumstein & J.
Pemen eds. 1988).
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or raise federal taxes, 90 even before the recent realization of the extent
of the Savings and Loan crisis and mobilization for the Middle East
crisis.9' For the future, we may look to the states by choice, as the appropriate locus to operate many aspects of even a national system.
The renewed appreciation for the value of state and local action has
many roots. One is the traditional conservative view that social issues
are best dealt with (or not dealt with) by the governments closest to the
people.9 Another, newer reason, is a growing appreciation for the expertise
of states and the growth in their abilities to tackle social problems. In
fact, in the last twenty years, certainly in health policy, many of the most
creative ideas for change have not been imposed from the top down but
rather have risen from the bottom up.93 Even "DRGs" for hospital payment,9 4 the one big 1980s success in federal health policy and cost-containment, at least from a federal policymaker's perspective, came from
the states.9 5 Other examples could also be cited, and the creativity and
96
talent of state officials have not gone unremarked elsewhere.
We also look to state and local action because circumstances differ.
Rural areas differ from urban. Unemployed uninsured are different from
employed. And so on. Perhaps more importantly, lacking national consensus at least for the present, we defer to state-by-state differences in
attitudes about insurance and about public action. States do genuinely
differ in political philosophy, not only about the extent of appropriate
governmental intervention in these matters but also about the means by
which to intervene. 97 Arizona is very different from Massachusetts, and
See, e.g., One Excuse after Another, EcONoMIsT 29 (Aug. 11, 1990).
91See, e.g., Knight, Risks Rise as S&L Crisis Grows More Intractable, Washington Post, Aug. 12, 1990, at H1, col.1; See, e.g., Atkinson & Hoffman, Suddenly,
a Long, Costly Crisis Looms: Gulf Confrontation Holds High Stakes for U.S. as
Hopes of Diplomatic Solution Fade, Washington Post, Aug. 12, 1990, at Al, col.
3.
" President Ronald W. Reagan, like President Nixon before him, called for a
"New Federalism." The unspoken understanding is that non-federal governments

cannot
print money and do not accept high levels of taxation.
93

See Bovbjerg, NurturingPolicy Ideas:In Search of Creative New Insights, 8
J. POLY ANAL. & MGrm 328 (1989) (on general creativity at state versus federal
level).
" DRG is the acronym for "diagnosis related group," the key component of
prospective payment for inpatient hospital care implemented in 1983. See, e.g.,
Schramm & Gabel, Prospective Payment: Some Retrospective Observations, 318
N. ENGL. J. MED. 1681 (1988).
The DRG method was invented at Yale and was first implemented in New
Jersey (with federal support). States had earlier pioneered prospective payment
and state regulation of hospital budgets; see, e.g., Bauer, Hospital Rate SettingThis Way to Salvation?in HOSPITAL COST CoNTAINMENT 324 (M. Zubkoff, I. Raskin
& R. Hanft eds. 1978); see, e.g., Biles, Schramm & Atkinson, HospitalCost Inflation
under State Rate-Setting Programs,303 N. ENGL. J. MED. 664 (1980) (New Jersey
was the first to adapt DRG methods to this end, and the method was then adapted
for federal payment under Medicare.)
9 National political columnist David Broder routinely gives prominence to this
theme. See, e.g., Broder, The Return Of Lawton Chiles, Washington Post, Apr. 18,
1990, at A27, coll.
1 States also differ in their fiscal resources, which is a standard argument for
federal intervention, as in Medicaid, to redistribute income and to make health
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national social consensus is much harder to achieve in the United States
than in more homogeneous foreign countries.98
Finally, recall that medical markets are mainly local. People go to
doctors and hospitals near them, styles of practice vary with locality,
health care labor is bought in local labor markets, and medical prices
vary by. metropolitan areas.9 Intervening with any specificity in how
medical care is delivered calls for some form of local administration. It
is quite hard to accomplish directly from Washington. 00 Similarly, in the
markets for insurance or HMOs, much of sales and service is local. States
have experience dealing with local medical providers and HMOs in operating Medicaid and other programs. Thus, not only do states play a
role when the federal government does not, but they also have important
advantages in their own right.
To be sure, there are limits to what states acting in isolation can accomplish. Mandating coverage for all is expensive, and even a state desiring to do so has to worry about imposing higher costs on its citizens
or businesses because people are mobile. High-priced states can lose out
in the competition for relocating business and citizens. It is probably not
insignificant that the first state to attempt any such mandate was Hawaii,

programs more equal. However, states vary greatly in their willingness to spend

state dollars on Medicaid - even holding constant objective factors like state
income, percentage of people under poverty line, and level of federal matching
payment. See J. HOLAHAN & J. COHEN, MEDICAID: THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COST
CONTANMENT AND AccEss To CARE (1986) (relative to Midwest, East 28% higher

in per capita Medicaid spending, West 25% lower, and South 43% lower). Cf.
Englehardt, Allocating Scarce Medical Resources: The Availability of Urban
Transplantation,311 N. ENGL. J. MED. 66 (1984) (difficulty of consensus on transplants).
98

Many Europeans, for example, simply cannot comprehend that people are

allowed to go without health care (or food or lodging) in the United States, which
could never happen in, say, Denmark or Holland, which are small, relatively well
to do countries where social consensus is strong, as is the cultural history of the
welfare state. Few Europeans have any concept of the difference between Massachusetts and Arizona, although they are getting a taste of differences in a
federal system as they bargain about further economic and political integration.
In the U.S., it is very, very hard to reach consensus on these issues because people
(and different states' taxpayers) have such fundamentally different values with

regard to individual and social responsibilities and about the appropriate role of

government. Americans are quite charitable on a one-on-one basis; and our private charity exceeds general European levels. In most of Europe, however, people
are much more comfortable with having the public sector make such transfers.
9 Medicare policies are made nationally and greatly affect the finances of
hospitals, the largest medical spenders. Many private insurers also operate nationally, and some contracts with national businesses apply nationwide. But even
Medicare hospital prices are separately computed for each metropolitan area, and
local hospitals and physicians affected by national rules must adapt within a
local marketplace.
110This does not mean that the basic contours cannot be agreed nationally.
The structure of fee schedules, basic coverage of benefits, minimum guidelines
for quality medical practice - these can all be national, and perhaps should be.
Their administration in the field is another matter.
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an island. 101 Yet, the state role is apt to remain primary for the immediate
future. Thus, many different approaches can be expected, according to
state preferences and how they see the problems.
V.

FACING TRADE-OFFS AND DESIGNING SOLUTIONS

A. The Inevitability of Trade-Offs
As noted, we lack consensus on goals in health care, not only philosophically but in terms of what affected interests want. Patients want
free access to care. They want relatively free choice of providers, or at
least most of them do. Physicians want freedom of clinical practice, freedom to take any patient and still be paid, freedom from (what they see
as) petty bureaucracy. Doctors also want freedom of contract with the
patient, freedom to set their own fees. Hospitals certainly want freedom
from uncompensated care and from a lot of regulations. Business and
insurers want freedom from a lot of the mandates they have been getting.
Everybody, it would seem, wants freedom from the lawyers, 10 2 especially
from the malpractice lawyers. 10 3
Freedom, of course, is good news. Hence, the rejoicing over events in
Eastern Europe. Who could be against freedom? However, one cannot
have all these freedoms at once and have freedom from fiscal folly. And
controlling spending is a sine qua non of expanded access to care, which,
other things equal, will raise medical prices considerably for everyone.
One lesson of the relatively new discipline of health economics is that in
health care, as elsewhere, an increase in (subsidized) demand, with no
change in supply, will raise prices.'( 4 It is simply impossible to fulfill all
these conflicting demands equally and at once. 05 Some choices must be
made to reconcile these conflicts, sorting out relative priorities. Such
choices are not easy.
If there were an easy, inexpensive solution, we would have enacted it
long ago.106 There is none. Hence, social and political leadership has a
1o No direct state mandates on employee benefit plans other than Hawaii's are
allowed under the federal ERISA legislation, but states can impose taxes on
businesses that do not insure to accomplish essentially the same objective, as
Massachusetts has done. See supra note 7, at 906-09 and note 21.
102See, e.g., Sansing, First, Kill All the Lawyers, WASHINGTONIAN 132 (Nov.
1990) (nation's capital especially "over-lawyered").
103See, e.g., A.M.A., A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE To THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE
SYSTEM, (AMA/Speciality Society Medical Liability Project, 1988).
1- See, e.g., Newhouse, Manning, & Morris, Some Interim Results from a Controlled Trial of Cost Sharing in Health Insurance, 305 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1501
(1981).
10- See Reinhardt, UncompensatedHospital Care, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL
CARE: RIGHTS AND REsPONsminrriEs 1-15 (F. Sloan, J. Blumstein & J. Perrin eds.
1985) (cannot achieve equity, freedom, and budgetary control at once).
1-0 The ins and outs of reconciling other goals with cost containment really
calls for another conference entirely, certainly for a much longer article than this
one.
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considerable role to play in making these choices.10 7 Moreover, any short
discussion of possible solutions, like the following, can necessarily only
begin to indicate the complexity of possible choices.
B. Approaches Toward Solutions
A jurisdiction seeking solution(s) needs to begin by deciding the nature
and extent of its problem(s), the available tools and traditions for
fashioning policy options, and its political desires. In crafting the best
solution, it is helpful to consider various objective circumstances, as well
as to reach certain political value judgments. How bad are problems for
different categories of the uninsured? Categories are usefully defined by
relation to policy instruments-such as the wholly uninsurable (e.g.,
chronically ill), those on the boundary of Medicaid, poor not covered by
Medicaid, workers in small businesses, and dependents of all of the above.
What direct and indirect costs are imposed on the public sector now? On
private parties? Such a focused assessment helps show the benefit to be
derived from improving access to care, and altruistic pleasure in helping
others should count as a benefit, where it is politically perceived as one.
What policy "infrastructure" is available in the jurisdiction? Places
vary. Are there strong public hospitals or a "chain" of public clinics to
build on? Is there a tradition of charity care among private physicians?
Are physicians located in areas of highest uninsurance? Are there Medicaid or HMOs or other providers with whom to contract? How interventionist is the jurisdiction with regard to hospital and physician fees (either
through regulatory or competitive means)? All these and more questions
of circumstances matter as to what options seem feasible in an area.
What approaches will the political culture support? This goes to the
values discussed in the prior section and the willingness to pay which is
discussed next. Basically this means deciding (a) whether one wants to
address medical services (hospital or other) or instead health insurance
of some kind and (b) whether one wants a global approach, or gap-filling
approach. The argument from this corner is that an insurance approach
is generally preferable. It focuses on the needy, not on health care providers, promotes access to a variety of care including less expensive noninstitutional care, encourages quality-enhancing competition, and has
other desirable characteristics. Yet, creating an insurance entitlement
makes costs harder to predict and control. If funds are deemed very short,
it makes a good deal of sense to focus on a provider of last resort, like a
public hospital.108 Public hospitals offer an unusual combination of addressing needs for the most urgent care and prospects for budgetary control. Rather than having to exclude most potentially needy in advance
For an excellent argument on the importance of leadership in achieving
public goals, as distinct from policy analysis or structural reform, see Behn, What
Counts?, Leadership Counts, J. POLY ANAL. & MGMT (1989).
11 See Bovbjerg, Held & Pauly, Privatizationand Bidding in the Health Care
Sector, 6 J. POLY ANALYSIS AND MGmT 648, 652-53 (1987).
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through a poorly funded insurance plan, a jurisdiction can expect to see
a medical-fiscal triage by a hospital make specific decisions to relative
needs.
Given sufficient commitment to proceed with an insurance approach,
the most important issue is whether to attempt to be comprehensive, as
almost no jurisdiction has yet attempted. Incremental approaches are
more common. Note that those who prefer the latter promote it as a
"building block" or "incremental" approach. Those with more global preferences deride it as a "patchwork" or even a "crazy quilt."'1 9 There are
reputable arguments both ways, and jurisdictions may certainly differ in
their choices. Incrementalists suggest not intervening more than necessary to fix what seems to be "broke," allowing different approaches to
flourish, and being wary of monopoly provision of services, whether public
or private. Globalists suggest that multiple systems leave cracks for people to fall through and claim that only centralized cost containment can
succeed. 110
Once such basic assessments are complete, designers of any plan must
specify, at a minimum: (a) Who is to be covered? Everyone, all citizens,
or specified populations? (b) What care or coverage is to be provided (or
required)? A bare-bones policy, comprehensive coverage, or something in
between? (c) What methods and levels of payments to providers are contemplated? The current system, capitation, negotiated fees, or discounted
cost? (d) What administrative and financing approach is to be taken?
Public, private or mixed administration? Full specification gets complex,
without even getting to what, if any, quality or cost-oriented initiatives
are to be part of the picture.
How is a policy maker or a jurisdiction to evaluate the possibilities? A
primary criterion is how many more people will be covered, of what types,
and with what benefits? In general, there is a trade-off between depth of
coverage (elaborateness of protection) and breadth of coverage (number
of people) at any given level of social willingness to finance coverage and
any given level of prevailing medical prices and style of practice. For
many globalists, cost containment is of the essence. One can imagine
09

At the conference referenced above, speakers in the morning sessions twice
used such terms - once each way. See also Freudenheim, Volleyball on Health
Care Costs, New York Times, December 7, 1989 at D1 ("frayed quilt" of U.S.
health care policy causes rising tensions); see also Kinzer, Universal Entitlement
to Health Care: Can We Get There from Here? 322 N. ENGL. J. MED. 467 (1990)

(dislikes policies of "disjointed incrementalism," term coined by John Dunlop).
110Globalists point to the relative success of other countries in slowing the
growth of health spending. Certain foreign-model health plans look untransportable if only because Americans are accustomed to a lot of individual choice
and (at least seeming) individual control. Confronted with a newly powerful
central government 200 years ago, individualistic Americans invent the Bill of
Rights. More recently, and more mundanely, Americans confronted with lower
speed limits have bought a lot of Fuzz-Busters. In health care, how well would
waiting lists for elective surgery "play" with American patients, premium payers,
or voters? Consider that Americans, asked to line up for anything, form not a
queue but a funnel.
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achieving economies on medical spending, but only with very significant
realignments of consumer and provider incentives going well beyond people who now lack coverage. Indeed, the short-run impact of improving
access to care among those who now lack it is probably inflationary;
increasing the dollars flowing through insurance or to hospitals will raise
demand for services and reduce price discipline on providers. In addition,
any assessment must consider the revenue options and distributional
effects of new taxes, premiums, and fees.
In making such judgments, policymakers should ponder the likely dynamics of any new system(s). Given new incentives, behavior will surely
change. Of course, that is the point; we want change or we would not
enact the program. However, the static picture that we look at nowwith so many uninsured, such patterns of usage, and the Blues doing this
and the Travelers doing that-may alter in unexpected ways. And unintended consequences are all too common. Especially if fundamentals of
today's system are left unchanged, look out for dynamic shifts, because
people will act in their own self-interest, not in the interest of policy
planners.
Space is lacking for any description, much less evaluation of the innumerable possible solutions. In considering any of them, the following
are reasonable suggestions. Policymakers need to be clear on the extent
of access desired, and on incentives for quality and cost containment.
They must also face the trade-offs between access and cost.' They need
to achieve consensus on specific goals and design plans specifically to
meet them, for it is easy to envisage disillusionment from promising more
than can be delivered. Simple as any given plan may be in conceptual
outline, the details are necessarily complex, and our various views of
rights and freedoms can easily come into conflict. So implementation can
readily prove economically and politically intractable. In part, this reflects uncertainty about costs and achievements; in particular, no one
knows for sure how to ensure that higher-intensity care is worth its cost.
Nor has any single approach to cost containment proven itself dominant.
Mostly, however, we do not agree on the value of the likely achievements
in relation to their costs.
Ultimately, it would seem that policymakers need to perform a rough
cost-benefit calculation. How much benefit goes to the uninsured, to providers of their services, to those at risk of uninsurance, and (altruistically)
to people at large? How much cost is borne by taxpayers or businesses in
exchange? Beyond the aggregate calculation, politics must of course consider who are the winners and losers. It seems easiest to weigh costs and
benefits for small changes, add-ons of various kinds for different constituencies, like the uninsurable, welfare mothers, and all the others. Indeed, the recent past has been characterized by a series of small, COBRA-

" See Shortell & McNerney, Criteria and Guideline for Reforming the U.S.
Health Care System, 322 N. ENGL. J. MED. 462 (1990) (attempt to set out frame-

work for judging NHI proposals).
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like shifts. The calculus gets harder where bigger changes are at stake,
especially changing the rules for people who already have coverage, for
people in general are content with their personal health care, although
they often say "the system" is in trouble. On the one hand, it seems
prudent not to try to "fix" what is not obviously "broke." On the other
hand, past some point, simple add-ons of coverage may be unacceptably
costly without more basic change in how everyone buys health care. This
brings us to the next section.
VI. AFFORDABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY
There is little doubt that reasonable approaches could cover many or
most of those now without insurance. Anyone can design good-looking
additional health benefits, and newly covered people (and their providers)
would benefit. Similarly, however, many of us could also design theoretically marvelous additions to our houses or apartments, perhaps for the
benefit of a new child or weekend visitors. The main question is just what
additions are worth their cost. Cost is properly measured not only in
dollars, but also in loss of freedom, convenience, diversity, and catering
to individual and group preferences. 1 2 For this discussion, however, let
us stick mainly to financial costs, as they are easier to quantify and
discuss.
Realistic plans for increasing coverage recognize that they will cost
money, certainly in the short run, even if new controls promise longerrun offsetting reductions in spending or spending increases.113 How do
people feel about spending more money, through taxes or increased private spending? One of the hard 'facts for analysts to face, and even harder
for pro-NHI advocates, is that ordinary people and voters do not seem to
value insurance coverage as highly as many health analysts do. Many
people seem to think that available coverage costs too much. Consider
that very few people are wholly uninsurable.14 Rather, they have chosen
12 This point of course sidesteps the issues of transfer-separate people paying
and benefiting, at least directly.
113
The Pepper Commision estimated a price tag of $66 billion, including expansions of coverage for long term care, not part of other proposals. See infra
notes 117 & 118 and accompanying text. A detailed simulation has estimated the
cost of a broad employer mandate to provide coverage for workers at a cost of $41
billion in 1988 pretax dollars (reaching 22 million additional people, with a rise

of 34% from current spending). S. ZEDLEWSKI, EXPANDING THE EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM (1990) (Urban Institute).
1"'Some of them are, in that they have health conditions or history that makes
them uninsurable at normal rates, yet unable to afford the premium for specialized
coverages. By various estimates, up to one percent of the population cannot get
health insurance at normal rates, see supra note 15 (although, technically, even
many of these could be insured-at some price-if-they were willing to apply to
Lloyd's of London or the like, to be specially underwritten and pay very high
premiums.) Even for those not normally insurable, in almost half the states,
special state-sponsored high risk pools offer comprehensive policies at heavily
subsidized prices. See generallyA. TRIPPLER, COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INSURANCE
FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (4th ed, 1990). Yet risk
pools have always fallen far short of reaching all those who could benefit. At the
end of 1989, risk pools in fact insured a total of just over 50,000 people in 14
states (with pools in 10 other states just begun or not yet operational). Id.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 4:2

not to insure themselves, their employers have chosen not to insure them,
and their governments have chosen not to insure them."15 Why is that?
The main problem for the non-poor and for society alike is that we are
not willing to pay for the style of coverage we want." 6 The social issue
is whether society is ready to force the uninsured or their employers or
states to buy coverage, and probably also to subsidize that choice.
It would seem that our wishes exceed our wallet, as President Bush
might say, not only individually but also collectively. Despite the frequently urged "fundamental" nature of health care, other priorities come
first. It is notable that the difficulties of achieving political consensus on
supporting significant new health spending led the Pepper Commission
initially to recommend how to increase coverage, estimating a price tag
of $6.6 billion without specifying how to meet that price with new taxes,
controls, or mandates. 117 The final report does not make specific recommendations, either. However, it does discuss numerous revenue options,
together with several criteria for judging their appropriateness."18
As another indicator, consider the opinion polls. Pollsters periodically
ask people (phrasing the question in different ways): Do you think we
should guarantee everyone health insurance. Usually, an overwhelming
majority of Americans say yes, we should." 9 Pollsters used to stop at that
point. Since California gave us Proposition 13 and Ronald Reagan, polls
now ask, quite appropriately: how much more are you willing to pay in
taxes? The answers are discouraging for expansions of coverage. Polls
generally find that fewer than a quarter of respondents are willing to
spend as much as $50 or more a year. 20 Many1 2observers have read the
results of the 1990 elections in the same light. '
115Most of those 30 odd million uninsured people are not desperately poor. See
M. SULVETrA & K. SWARTz, supra note 73 (two thirds above poverty line, one

third above twice poverty).
1l6 Additional problems of course exist: Coverages available for sale (or enact-

ment) can be too "rich" for buyers' "tastes." The uninsured may also misperceive
their risk of needing coverage or overestimate the comprehensiveness of the social
safety net for the uninsured. There are also organizational difficulties for the

small businesses seeking insurance for employees, especially that the regulatory
and informational cost is enormous, and risk selection works against many of
them. Still, we ought to remember that failure to buy coverage reflects a consumer

and workplace choice. It may make many of us unhappy to see nonpoor parents
not protecting their children, for example, but in some sense they are making

that choice.

117E.g., Wagner, Pepper Panel's Healthcare Blueprint Omits Funding,Bipartisian Support, MODERN HEALTHcARE 20 (March 12, 1990).
118Pepper Report, supra note 10, at 137-38 and Appendix 7.
19 See Stevens, Patients Give Uncle Sam a Big Vote, MEDicAL ECONOMIcs 83
(April 23, 1990) (in 1989 survey, 31% of public favored national health service
or Canadian-style insurance, 46% traditional U.S. fee-for-service medicine, versus
20%0 and 61% in 1976).
1 Id. at 90; see also Berg, Poll: Increase Health Care, but Not Costs, American
Medical News, July 27, 1990, at 6, col. 2; see generally Gabel, Cohen & Fink,
supra note 30.
121 See, e.g., Apple, The Big Vote Is for "No," New York Times, Nov. 8, 1990,
at Al, col. 4; Stone, Voters Turn Tight-Fisted; Theme: "HoldLine on New Spending," USA Today, Nov. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
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How might people be led to want less (query on the realism of this
plan), to accept major changes and reallocations in health care (query
again), or to be willing to pay more, as premium-payers, employees, employers, members of business coalitions, or taxpayers? Despite current
fears and uncertainties, the U.S. is not a poor country, 122 and we can
afford to pay more if we want to, through taxes or otherwise. 123 As yet,
people are not convinced that paying more is a worthwhile "deal.'' 24 We
need to do more to ensure that payers get good value for health care.
People really are not convinced of that. The problem is how such economizing choices can be identified and effectuated. Clearly, it is possible
to spend less and still have a decent life. Many countries accomplish this
trick. But identifying low-value care in advance is not easy, and patients'
perceptions of value may differ from that of academic or government
reviewers. This line of thought leads us back into the whole cost containment discussion and questions of what might work and be acceptable
in an American context. 125
It would also help, and it is healthy, that people are beginning to feel
a little more mortal. That is one of the side effects of today's tremendous

122Herbert Stein has noted that at current United States and Japanese growth
rates, Japan will not attain the United States per capita GNP for 33 years. See

Penner, Japanand the United States: Can this MarriageBe Saved? PoLicY BITES,
June 1990 [Urban Inst. bimonthly publ., no. 1].
12 Again, this article sidesteps the political debate about what taxes, if any,
are appropriate. It can be noted in passing that "sin" taxes and pollution (or
carbon) taxes have a politically appealing connection to poor health. California
has recently expanded health coverage using a higher cigarette tax. Academic
debates rage on the relative efficiency of different forms of taxation. The Pepper
Report gives a good listing of potential federal revenue sources, supra note 10,
Appendix F.
12 For example, 43% of respondents to one poll thought that increased public
involvement to ensure full access would be a "costly mistake," 76% that even
doubling expenditures still should not pay for all the care the public wantsindicating skepticism about the value of such care. Berg, supra note 120. Some
assert that money is not needed, merely reallocation, see Medisplurge:America's
Exorbitant Health Care System Does Not Require More Spending, EcONOMwr 5
(March 10, 1990); but whether any savings in one area (e.g., privately insured
spending on elective surgery) can be reallocated elsewhere (e.g., prenatal care
for uninsured mothers to be) is problematic. However, having a more cost-effective
medical system would likely raise political willingness to expand public funding,
as noted in text.
12,
Americans would probably be willing collectively to get 95% of the measurable health outcomes we now get for two thirds of the cost, if that was the
choice. In some areas of medicine, there may be trade-offs of this magnitude,
although this is much debated, and the presence of non-measurable outcomes,
like reassurance, complicates the issue. Of course, as fully insured individuals,
we are less prone to make trade-offs if life or even peace of mind is at stake.
When we are conventionally insured, we all want Mercedes medicine, which
certainly does not encourage low-style care among doctors and hospitals competing for our patronage. It would be instructive if people were really given a
choice of a Hyundai health care option, but that has never had a true test, and
it is quite unclear that individuals would choose it. Interestingly, Hyundai itself
is now attempting to move its cars "upmarket." South Korea's Carmakers:Starting
Over, THE ECONOMIST 78 (Nov. 3, 1990).
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focus on personal health, not to mention the AIDS epidemic. Quite a few
people are without insurance for some period of time, and more may come
to appreciate that true adversity could happen to them. The likelihood
of losing a job has come home to more people, even middle class, well
insured people. Not even the phone company provides the kind of employment security it once did. And perhaps when it is not merely "the
other guy" at risk, people will be more open to greater protections.
These thoughts are speculative at best.'2 6 A larger question is whether
political leadership or social change will give Americans more of the
communal sense that much of the world has about health services. Today,
we do not have the sense that "we are all in this together." We do not
even seem to have the same intergenerational compact that we used to
have about Social Security and Medicare. Traditional liberals argue that
the social base of public programs has to be broader to maintain public
support. Others are more mistrustful of public efforts.
VII. A

FINAL NOTE

In sum, we need to know more about the value of different health
benefits, and we need to come to more consensus on what constitutes
acceptable as opposed to achievable levels. The public needs to appreciate
the risk of uninsurance, and we need more agreement on how to contain
costs. Better crafted plans for increasing coverage or funding might also
conceivably help.
What we need most of all, however, is not more information or analysis,
but rather more leadership. Leadership is needed to educate, to help forge
advance consensus where possible, and to propose hard trade-offs alone
where not possible. Such leadership is at least as likely to come from the
grass roots as from Washington.
It also seems likely that further American solutions for the uninsured,
whenever and wherever they develop, will not be wholly public or wholly
private. The private sector and employment-based coverage seem likely
to continue, and the public role will probably not be wholly federal or
wholly state. In each case, we can expect instead some kind of combination, in recognition of American diversity, both philosophic and geographic. From this conclusion Europhiles may despair, but Americans
can find encouragement. The arguments for a federal role are strongest
with regard to certain minimum structural changes and for achieving
more equal funding. With regard to field operations, however, most of the
encouraging developments are occurring outside Washington. A national
system should continue to encourage experimentation and diversity.
126 Consider, for example, that people do not seem to become more generous
during the adversity of a recession. It is notable that the early 1980s recession
saw numerous Medicaid cutbacks. Recent increases in the face of feared recession
have occurred at the federal level; most states have lobbied against increased
mandates without increased revenue. Casual social-political science suggests that
recessions do not induce an ethic of "we are all in this together," but rather mainly
hurt, marginal, laid-off workers.

